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MONETARY LIABILITY OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 
UNDER THE IDEA AND SECTION 504/ADA 
 
 
Perry A. Zirkel∗ 
 
Consider this hypothetical case in terms of the likely re-
sulting federal court ruling as to whether the individual school 
defendants were personally liable for money damages. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
K.G. moved with her mother to the Rural School Dis-
trict when she finished grade six and her parents obtained a di-
vorce.  K.G.’s transition from her former residence in a large 
city was not an easy one.  She did not previously have any pri-
vate diagnoses or special education services.  When K.G.’s 
grade seven homeroom teacher promptly noticed her problems 
with attendance and anxiety, he arranged for K.G.’s participa-
tion in the school’s response to intervention (RTI) program.  
Her attendance improved, and she appeared to be overcoming 
her anxiety at school, but she still had too many absences.  Ac-
cording to the parent’s complaint to the principal, K.G. contin-
ued to “melt down” at home, and, the teacher was not suffi-
ciently empathetic about her plight as a single parent in a new 
community.  The principal arranged for increased RTI services 
and added special attention from the school counselor.  During 
the school’s next regularly scheduled parent-teacher confer-
ence, which was in late April of grade seven, the homeroom 
teacher conveyed suggestions from the counselor and the RTI 
team for continuity of their interventions in the home envi-
 
∗ Perry A. Zirkel has a J.D. and a Ph.D. in Educational Administration from the University of 
Connecticut and a Master of Laws from Yale University.  He is University Professor Emeritus 
of Education and Law at Lehigh University. 
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ronment.  K.G.’s mother perceived these recommendations as 
implying that K.G.’s problems were attributable to her parent-
ing. Soon thereafter, K.G stopped coming to school.  In June, 
the district attendance officer initiated truancy proceedings, 
and K.G.’s mother responded by withdrawing K.G. from the 
district and placing her for grade eight in a cyber program op-
erated by a private school located in a district in a neighboring 
state.  During the first part of grade eight, the school district 
where the private school was located evaluated K.G., finding 
that she was eligible under the IDEA and, as a result, provided 
her with a “services plan” (per the equitable participation provi-
sions of the IDEA regulations).  K.G.’s mother sent an angry e-
mail to K.G.’s former homeroom teacher, with copies to the 
principal and district’s central office administration.  The e-
mail notified them of K.G.’s IDEA eligibility and remonstrated 
them for initiating truancy proceedings rather than providing a 
special education evaluation and special education services. 
Midway during K.G.’s grade nine year, K.G.’s mother filed for 
a due process hearing, seeking tuition reimbursement and/or 
compensatory education for two alleged violations: (1) “child 
find,” or the district’s failure to evaluate K.G., during grade 
seven, and (2) the district’s failure to offer the evaluation/IEP 
process for grade nine.  A few months later, she separately filed 
suit in federal court against the teacher, the principal, the spe-
cial education director, and the superintendent in their personal 
capacities (i.e., not in their official capacities, which would be 
merely as proxies for the school district).  Explaining in her 
complaint that the IDEA does not authorize hearing officers to 
award money damages, she specifically sought this remedy from 
the court for alternative counts under (a) the IDEA, (b) Section 
504 and the ADA, (c) Section 1983 for violations of the IDEA, 
and (d) Section 1983 for violations of Section 504 and/or the 
ADA.  The defendants filed a motion of dismissal, which would 
end the litigation before moving to the pretrial phase of deposi-
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tions and interrogatories. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
The underlying broader question is whether school dis-
trict personnel, such as the teacher and special education direc-
tor, may be liable for money damages in suits under the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1 or Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act (§ 504)2 and its sister statute, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 either directly or in 
connection with Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (§ 1983)?4  
It is not uncommon for special education personnel, as well as 
their general education colleagues who serve students with dis-
abilities, to have a career-affecting fear of being sued under 
these federal laws for monetary liability.5  The sources of this 
fear are multiple, including (1) the professional literature’s fail-
ure to unpack this complex legal issue; (2) school insurance 
companies and the organizations, such as teacher unions, that 
offer this benefit; (3) school administrators who share this legal 
misconception; (4) school attorneys and school leaders who fos-
ter, rather than correct, this misconception based on a preven-
tive rationale; and (5) advocacy organizations and parent attor-
neys who view fear of liability as beneficial for their clients.6 
 
 1.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 –1482 (2016). 
  2.   20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 –1482 (2016). 
 3.  U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (2016). 
 4.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2016). 
 5.  See, e.g., Michele Wilson Kamens, Susan J. Loprete, & Francis A. Slostad,  Class-
room Teachers’ Perceptions about Inclusion and Preservice Teacher Education, 11 TEACHING 
EDUC. 147, 153 (2000) (reporting incidental survey finding of concern with personal liability of 
general education teachers for students with disabilities in their classes); Joy Williams & Cathe-
rine Dikes, The Implications of Demographic Variables as Related to Burnout Among a Sam-
ple of Special Education Teachers, 135 EDUC. 337, 338 (2001) (observing that the “liability 
potentialities” of special education laws contribute to burnout of special education teachers). 
 6.  These sources are based largely on my four decades of experience in the field.  The 
woefully limited literature contributes to the misconceptions.  E.g., Barbara L. Pazey & 
Heather A. Cole, The Role of Special Education Training in the Development of Socially Just 
Leaders, 49 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 243, 244 (2012) (asserting, directly in connection with the 
IDEA, that “[s]ignificant liability exists for administrators and instructional personnel who fall 
short of performing their duties and responsibilities with respect to students with disabilities”).  
Even though their cited support did not at all address such purportedly significant liability, 
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Identifying the pertinent court decisions in response to 
the dismissal motion in not only the opening scenario but also 
other such federal cases depends on successive sources of in-
formation, starting with a working knowledge of the relevant 
meaning of legal bases, such as the IDEA, § 504, and § 1983.  
Part I of this article provides an overview of these avenues of 
litigation.  Part II synthesizes the case law that demarcates the 
availability and applicability of the IDEA and § 504/ADA ave-
nues as the direct basis for money damages claims.  Part III syn-
thesizes the corresponding case law rulings for money damages 
claims that combine these alternate IDEA and § 504/ADA ave-
nues with the special role of § 1983.  The final part provides a 
discussion of the practical implications of this legal analysis, in-
cluding a revisiting of the opening case scenario to illustrate the 
answer to the personal liability question as specifically applied 
to school personnel.  
 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTIFIED STATUTORY AVENUES 
 
The IDEA is the primary legislation for students with 
disabilities in P–12 schools,7 who accounted for 12.5% of the 
public school population in 2015–16.8  Providing an individual 
right to adjudicative relief, starting with a due process hearing 
and extending to litigation in federal and state courts, the IDEA 
 
their assertion has become part of the foundation of subsequent scholarship.  E.g., Benjamin H. 
Dotger & April Coughlin, Examining School Leaders’ Simulated Interactions in Support of 
Students with Autism, 31 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 27, 28 (2018); Heather Glowacki & 
Donald G. Hackman, The Effectiveness of Special Education Teacher Evaluation Processes, 47 
PLANNING & CHANGING 191, 204 (2016) (citing Pazey & Cole to show that special education 
poses significant liability). 
 7.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, An Updated Comprehensive Comparison of the IDEA and 
Section 504/ADA, 342 EDUC. L. REP. 886 (2017) (showing the primacy of the IDEA by sys-
tematically comparing it with § 504 and the ADA). 
 8.  Perry A. Zirkel & Tiedan Huang, State Rates of 504-Only Students in K-12 Public 
Schools: An Update, 354 EDUC. L. REP. 621, 624 (2018) (reporting the results for the most 
recent available school year in the U.S. Department of Education’s Civil Rights Data Collec-
tion). 
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accounts for an extensive body of case law.9  The wide range of 
issues under the IDEA and its regulations start with child find 
and eligibility and center on the IDEA’s core obligation to pro-
vide each eligible child with a free appropriate public education 
(FAPE), as documented in an individualized education program 
(IEP).10 
Serving in a secondary, yet broader role, § 504 and the 
ADA, cover not only the students entitled to IEPs under the 
IDEA but also those—approximating an additional 2.3% of the 
school population—who have 504 plans.11  The § 504 regula-
tions also provide the right to a due process hearing and a par-
allel but much less detailed range of requirements, including el-
igibility and FAPE.12  Due to their close relationship, akin to 
being fraternal twins in relation to public schools, § 504 and the 
ADA typically serve as a joint avenue in the applicable case law 
as an addition or alternative to the IDEA. 
Finally, § 1983 first became law in 1871 and was origi-
nally known as the Ku Klux Klan Act because it served as a pro-
tection for the newly freed slaves.  However, based on its 
broad-based language,13 § 1983 is a generic civil rights act that 
provides for liability of school employees or anyone else acting 
 
 9.  E.g., Tessie Rose Bailey & Perry A. Zirkel, Frequency Trends of Court Decisions 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 28 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 3 
(2015) (analyzing the frequency of IDEA litigation on a state-by-state basis); Zorka Karanxha & 
Perry A. Zirkel, Trends in Special Education Case Law, 27 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 55 
(2014) (tracking the frequency and outcomes of IDEA court decisions from 1998 to 2012). 
 10.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education Law: Illustrative Basics and Nuances of Key 
IDEA Components, 38 TCHR. EDUC. & SPECIAL EDUC. 263 (2015) (explaining child find, eli-
gibility, and FAPE under the IDEA). 
 11.  Zirkel & Huang, supra note 8, at 625.  Referred to as “504-only” in such sources, 
these students typically have a designated document often referred to as a 504 plan, although § 
504 does not specifically require these forms.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Does Section 504 Require a 
Section 504 Plan for Each Eligible Non-IDEA Student?,  40 J.L. & EDUC. 407 (2011). 
 12.  34 C.F.R. §§ 104.31–.39 (2017). 
 13.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2016) (“Every person who, under color of [law] . . . subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any . . . other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). 
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with apparent governmental authority upon violating the Con-
stitution or other federal laws.  However, § 1983 does not serve 
as an independent basis for suit; without the prerequisite of vio-
lation of a federal substantive right, § 1983 does not provide a 
remedy.  Instead, analogous to an all-purpose “handle” for civil 
rights suits, it requires connection to an otherwise freestanding 
federal law, whether it is a provision in the U.S. Constitution or 
in federal legislation.14  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
gradually developed various requirements for connecting § 
1983 to federal statutes,15 with the result that its application in 
the context of the IDEA and § 504/ADA is far from automat-
ic.16   
The lurking question beyond the usual IDEA and § 
504/ADA school district remedies, which primarily consist of 
orders for tuition reimbursement or compensatory education 
services,17 is whether individual school employees are subject to 
personal liability for money damages upon violation of these 
statutes?  An answer to this question lies in the case law con-
cerning two overlapping avenues—Are money damages availa-
ble under the IDEA and/or § 504/ADA either (1) directly or (2) 
via the generic, connector federal civil rights act, § 1983?  A 
complete answer warrants a two-step, flowchart-like analysis for 
each of these alternative routes.  More specifically, for each of 
these direct and indirect routes, the analysis starts with the 
 
 14.  This “handle” analogy is only for the limited purpose of showing the role and scope 
of this generic civil rights law, as compared with the substantively specific civil rights laws, such 
as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
 15.  E.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (holding that § 
1983 may not be used to enforce federal statutory limitations on local zoning authority). 
 16.  E.g., Rebecca L. Bouchard, The Relationship between the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act and Section 1983, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 301 (2003) (explaining the 
contours of § 1983 and the IDEA and interpreting the intersection as not authorizing compen-
satory damages). 
 17.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE under the IDEA, 
33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 214 (2015) (analyzing a broad sample of IDEA FAPE 
cases to find that tuition reimbursement and compensatory education are the two most frequent 
remedies). 
ZIRKEL.DOCM  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  12:10 PM 
1] Monetary Liability of Public School Employees  
7 
 
availability of money damages for school defendants generally, 
including the districts, and culminates in the application of 
these alternatives specifically for individual school employees, 
such as general education or special education teachers. 
 
II.  THE CASE LAW FOR THE TWO DIRECT ROUTES 
IDEA 
 
The conclusion is quite clear that individual school em-
ployees are not liable for money damages under the IDEA it-
self, that is, without the § 1983 handle.18  The reasons are the 
answers to the successive issues of whether this particular rem-
edy is available under the IDEA and, if so, whether it applies to 
individual school personnel. 
Availability. The threshold reason concerns whether 
the IDEA provides money damages as a remedy.  Although 
sometimes addressing it only indirectly or incidentally, the pub-
lished decisions of various high federal courts have long and 
uniformly ruled that the money damages are not available un-
der the IDEA.  For example, in Burlington School Committee 
v.  Massachusetts Department of Education,19 the Supreme 
Court ruled that tuition reimbursement is available under the 
IDEA, because this remedy, in contrast with “damages,” is 
“merely requir[ing] the [school district] to belatedly pay ex-
penses that it should have paid all along and would have borne 
in the first instance had it developed a proper IEP.”20  Various 
published federal appellate court cases reached the same con-
clusion in the context of applying the IDEA’s “exhaustion” pro-
vision, which requires, with limited exceptions, completion of 
the Act’s administrative hearing process as a prerequisite to fil-
 
 18.   See supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining “handle” in this context). 
 19.  471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
 20.  Id. at 370–71. 
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ing for court action.21  More specifically, these appellate courts 
have observed that money damages are not available directly 
under the IDEA.22  Addressing the matter more directly, the 
following courts of appeal, in chronological order, have held 
that money damages, in contrast with equitable remedies such 
as tuition reimbursement and compensatory education services, 
are not available under IDEA: Sixth Circuit,23 Eighth Circuit,24 
Fourth Circuit,25 Second Circuit,26 First Circuit,27 Eleventh 
Circuit,28 Ninth Circuit,29 and Third Circuit.30  
Applicability.  The second reason why employees are 
not liable for damages under the IDEA is simpler.  Even if the 
courts had interpreted the IDEA as directly allowing for the 
remedy of money damages, the parties under this Act, are lim-
ited to the parents and the education agencies, not the individ-
ual employees.  The courts have interpreted (a) the parents’ 
side to include not only the child but also, on an independent 
basis, the parents31 and (b) the agency side to extend in similarly 
limited circumstances to the state level.32  They have made 
 
 21.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2016). 
 22.  E.g., Witte v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 1997); Charlie F. v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 23.  Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 980 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 24.  Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 25.  Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 26.  Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
 27.  Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 28.  Ortega v. Bibb Cty. Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 29.  C.O. v. Portland Pub. Sch., 679 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2009).  In recent unpublished 
rulings, a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit corrected its earlier denial of dismissal of an 
IDEA claim against individual school employees in their personal capacities. Crofts v. Issaquah 
Sch. Dist., No. C17-1365RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186407 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2017), 
further proceedings, No. C17-1365RAJ, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54868 (W.D. Wash. March 
30, 2018). 
 30.  Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 587 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 31.  E.g., Winkelman v. Parma City Sch., 550 U.S. 515 (2007). 
 32.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, State Education Agencies as Defendants under the IDEA and 
Related Federal Laws, 336 EDUC. L. REP. 667 (2016) (identifying the case law that extends the 
IDEA on a limited basis to state agency defendants). 
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equally clear that individual employees are neither plaintiffs nor 
defendants under the IDEA.33 
§ 504 and the ADA 
The analysis is much shorter than under the IDEA, and 
the answer is the same for claims under § 504. Although money 
damages are available under § 504 and its sister civil rights stat-
ute, the ADA, they apply to the institution, not the individual.  
Thus, although courts have varied as to the scope of school is-
sues subject to the damages remedy under § 504 and the 
ADA,34 they have uniformly agreed that neither of these federal 
laws, without § 1983, provides for liability of school employees 
in their individual capacity.35   
 
III.  THE CASE LAW FOR THE INDIRECT ROUTES OF THE § 
1983 CONNECTION 
 
In the face of the solid barrier against money damage 
claims against individual school employees directly under the 
IDEA and § 504/ADA, parents of students with disabilities have 
sought to establish such liability by filing claims under § 1983 
in connection with the IDEA or § 504/ADA.  Per the Part I 
overview, § 1983 includes this remedy against persons with 
governmental authority in connection with violations of the 
Constitution or other federal laws, but the Supreme Court has 
gradually developed limits in this approach to money damages 
 
 33.  E.g., Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006) (ruling that the 
IDEA does not provide for any monetary relief against individual school officials named in their 
personal capacities). 
 34.  E.g., C.O., 679 F.3d at 1169 (concluding that the “murky parameters” of the scope 
of liability under § 504 and the ADA do not extend to the admissions policies of a magnet 
school). 
 35.  E.g., A.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 840 F. Supp. 2d 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Ebonie 
v. Pueblo Sch. Dist., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Colo. 2011); D.A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 
716 F. Supp. 2d 603 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 629 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2010); 
Taylor v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 513 F. Supp. 2d 540 (W.D. Pa. 2007).  Some jurisdictions 
provide a limited exception for retaliation claims.  E.g., P.N. v. Greco, 282 F. Supp. 2d 221 
(D.N.J. 2003). 
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depending on the nature of the federal statute. 
 
A. IDEA 
 
The answer to the monetary liability issue for school 
employees under the IDEA via a § 1983 suit is more complicat-
ed, but ultimately, almost as clearly the same.  The reasons are 
again successive, starting the threshold issue of availability of 
this remedy under this indirect, or connected, approach and 
culminating, to the extent available, with its attempted applica-
tion to school employees. 
Availability.  The threshold issue of whether § 1983 is 
available for IDEA claims, thus providing the potential for 
monetary liability of individual school district employees, has 
been the subject of substantial litigation, with the clear trend in 
favor of a negative answer.36  The following table provides an 
overview of the pertinent case law, with the entries largely in 
chronological order and with those by the federal circuit courts 
of appeals in larger font to represent their higher precedential 
weight.  The cross-outs represent lower court cases that were 
superseded by subsequent court decisions covering that juris-
diction but at the same or a higher judicial level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36.  The limited education literature pre-dated the crystallization of this clear trend.  
E.g., Antonis Katsiyannis & John W. Maag, Ensuring Appropriate Education: Emerging Rem-
edies, Litigation, Compensation, and Other Considerations, 63 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 451, 
457–59 (1997) (canvassing the case law in this § 1983 route without distinction between de-
fendant districts and defendant employees in their individual capacities). 
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Chronological Overview of § 1983-IDEA Case Law for 
Threshold, Availability Step 
 
These specific entries and their overall trend become clearer via 
a sequential summary of this gradually crystallizing case law.  
The earliest § 1983-IDEA court decision was Doe v. 
Withers,37 which held a teacher liable for $5,000 in compensa-
tory damages and an additional $10,000 in punitive damages for 
refusing to follow the IEP of a student with disabilities.  Seem-
ingly indicating that money damages are available against indi-
vidual school employees under the IDEA when connected to § 
1983, this decision was relatively well publicized in the educa-
 
 37.  Order and Jury Order, Doe v. Withers, Civil Action No. 92-C-92, 20 IDELR 422 
(Taylor Cty. W. Va. Cir. Ct. 1993) (LRP Special Ed Connection, Caselaw Database). 
 
Is § 1983 Availing for IDEA Violations? 
  YES   NO 
 Crocker (6th Cir. 1992) 
 Heidemann (8th Cir. 1996) 
Doe v. Withers (W.V. Cir. Ct. 
1993) 
Sellers (4th Cir. 1998) 
 Padilla (10th Cir. 2000) 
 Diaz-Fonseca (1st Cir. 2006) 
W.B. (3d Cir. 1995) A.W. (3d Cir. 2007) 
Marie O. (7th Cir. 1997)  
R.B. (S.D.N.Y. 2000)  
Goleta (C.D. Cal. 2002); Roe 
(D. Nev. 2004) 
Blanchard (9th Cir. 2007) 
 L.M.P. (lower federal ct. in 
FL 2015) 
 Stanek (7th Cir. 2015)? 
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tion literature.38  However, a more careful and current consid-
eration reveals that the decision is of relatively negligible legal 
significance for several reasons.  First, it was a state trial court 
decision in West Virginia, not appearing either officially or in 
the two major databases for court decisions, thus having negli-
gible precedential value.  Second, the facts in this case went be-
yond noncompliance or insubordination; the teacher in this 
case not only refused to implement the testing accommodations 
in the child’s IEP but also did so by insulting and belittling the 
child in front of his general education classmates.  Third, the 
connected legal basis was not specifically the IDEA, instead 
seeming to extend as much or more to the Constitution.  More 
specifically, although starting with § 1983, the court’s opinion 
merely recited the requisite connection as the parents’ claim for 
“[damages] as a result of these constitutional deprivations,” 
vaguely identified as “[the student’s] statutorily protected civil 
right to a FAPE as guaranteed by federal and state laws for the 
education of handicapped children and as protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. . . .”39 Finally and most significantly, 
the much more weighty court decisions since then in the same 
and other jurisdictions have ultimately had a net superseding 
effect in the opposite direction.   
The shift in the prevailing view started with a split of ju-
dicial authority during the immediately subsequent decade, 
which included a Fourth Circuit decision that effectively 
preempted this West Virginia ruling to whatever extent that it 
applied to the IDEA.  More specifically, in the early published 
 
 38.  E.g., Antonis Katsiyannis, Jennifer S. Ellenburg, & Olivia M. Acton, Address Indi-
vidual Needs: The Role of General Educators, 36 INTERVENTION & SCH. CLINIC 116 (2000); 
Monica Conrad & Todd Whitaker, Inclusion and the Law, 70 CLEARING HOUSE 207 (1997); 
Monica K. Weishaar, The Regular Educator’s Role in the Individual Education Plan Process, 
75 CLEARING HOUSE 96 (2001); Perry A. Zirkel, A Costly Lack of Accommodations, 75 PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN, 652 (1994). 
 39.  Amended Complaint, Doe v. Withers, Civil Action No. 92-C-92, 20 IDELR 422 
¶¶ 32, 33 (Taylor Cty. W. Va. Cir. Ct. 1993) (LRP Special Ed Connection, Caselaw Database). 
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decisions that extended their rulings under the IDEA directly 
to the § 1983 connection, the Fourth Circuit,40 along with the 
Sixth Circuit41 and the Eighth Circuit,42 summarily ruled that 
money damages are not available under the IDEA via § 1983.  
Subsequently, in a more detailed analysis, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion.43 
However, in a similarly detailed analysis on the other 
side of the ledger, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in W.B. 
v. Matula held that money damages were available under the 
IDEA via § 1983.44  Although expressly cautioning in favor of 
awarding compensatory education or tuition reimbursement, 
the three-judge panel refused to “preclude the awarding of 
monetary damages.”45 Next, a federal district court decision in 
the Third Circuit predictably followed this precedent.46  
Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion 
with its own detailed analysis.47 Additional published lower 
court decisions arose in the early 2000s within the Second Cir-
cuit48 and the Ninth Circuit,49 but they relied instead on the ab-
sence of contrary appellate authority in their respective jurisdic-
tions.   
Subsequent federal appeals court decisions not only add-
 
 40.  Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of City of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 41.  Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 980 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 42.  Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1996).  Effectively superseding its ear-
lier decision in Digre v. Roseville Schools Independent District No. 623, 841 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 
1988) at least for monetary liability, the court “[held] that plaintiffs’ claims based upon defend-
ants’ alleged violations of the IDEA may not be pursued in this § 1983 action because general 
and punitive damages for the types of injuries alleged by plaintiffs are not available under the 
IDEA.” Id. at 1033. 
 43.  Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 44.  67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 45.  Id. at 495. 
 46.  P.N. v. Greco, 282 F. Supp. 2d 221 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 47.  Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 48.  R.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 99 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 49.  Roe v. Nevada, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (D. Nev. 2004); Goleta Union Elementary 
Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (C.D. Cal. 2001), further proceedings, 248 F. Supp. 
2d 936 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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ed the First Circuit to the majority,50 but also negated the earli-
er rulings in the Third and Ninth Circuit.  Specifically, in A.W. 
v. Jersey City Public Schools51 the full membership of the 
Third Circuit reversed the aforementioned52 panel in W.B. v 
Matula.  Expressly relying on an intervening Supreme Court 
decision regarding the availability of § 1983 to remedy federal 
statutory violations53 and the cogent opinions of the aforemen-
tioned54 Fourth and Tenth Circuit decisions in Sellers and Pa-
dilla, respectively, the Third Circuit concluded, “Congress did 
not intend § 1983 to be available to remedy violations of the 
IDEA.”55  Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed with the Third Circuit’s “well-reasoned opinion.”56 
More recently, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that 
its earlier view warranted re-visitation in light of intervening 
Supreme Court decision, which the Third Circuit had relied on 
in A.W. to reverse its view.57  However, in ordering that the 
lower court hold further proceedings in this case, the Seventh 
Circuit declined to address the § 1983 issue because, depending 
on the lower court’s subsequent disposition, “[i]t is not clear 
that resolution of this question will make any practical differ-
ence in this case.”58  
The corresponding more recent decisions in or at the 
Second Circuit have not re-visited the aforementioned59 ruling 
in R.B. v. Board of Education of the City of New York.  How-
ever, R.B. is a decision of the lower federal court of the South-
 
 50.  Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 51.  486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 52.  See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 53.  See supra note 15. 
 54.  See cases cited supra notes 40 and 43. 
 55. A.W., 486 F.3d at 803. 
 56.  Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 57.  Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 783 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 58.  Id. at 644. 
 59.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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ern District of New York, thus only applying to a limited seg-
ment of a state.  Moreover, the subsequent Third and Ninth 
Circuit decisions, in combination with the other uniform au-
thority that also extends to lower court jurisdictions in the re-
maining jurisdictions,60 cast the status of R.B. in doubt. 
Thus, with the limited possible exceptions of this federal 
district court ruling in New York and the uncertainty in the 
Seventh Circuit, the indirect route of connecting § 1983 to the 
IDEA seems to reach the same dead end as the direct route un-
der the IDEA for the threshold availability of money damages 
under the IDEA.  More specifically, using the § 1983 handle in 
most jurisdictions does not change the unavailability of the 
IDEA for suing teachers and other school personnel for money 
damages. 
Application. To the limited extent of jurisdictions, if 
any, in which § 1983 is available for IDEA violations, the de-
fendant may be the individual school district employee, but a 
few additional potentially high hurdles apply.  First, the em-
ployee must be directly involved. Supervisory liability is not vi-
carious, instead requiring a direct culpable conduct or a close 
causal connection.61 Second, the doctrine of qualified immunity 
applies, precluding liability where the employee’s IDEA viola-
tion is not, in terms of applicable precedents, clearly settled.  
More specifically, the employee is not liable unless a reasonable 
school employee in the same shoes would have understood at 
the time that he was violating the IDEA.62 
 
 60.  E.g., L.M.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 61.  E.g., Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Sch., 715 F.3d 775, 788 (10th Cir. 2013) (con-
cluding that without showing the requisite causal connection the plaintiffs forfeited their super-
visory liability claim under § 1983, which here was connected to Fourteenth Amendment sub-
stantive due process); Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Ordway, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 
1300–01 (C.D. Cal. 2001), further proceedings, 248 F. Supp. 2d 936 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting 
supervisory liability under § 1983-IDEA due to lack of the requisite connection). 
 62.  E.g., Ordway, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1302 (concluding that the individual defendant’s 
action amounted to a clearly established violation of the IDEA).  However, Ninth Circuit prec-
edent subsequently negated the threshold availability of damages under IDEA.  See supra note 
ZIRKEL.DOCM  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  12:10 PM 
BYU Education & Law Journal [2019 
16 
 
B. § 504 and the ADA 
 
Some jurisdictions do not allow § 504 claims via § 1983.  
For example, in a relatively thorough analysis in A.W. v. Jersey 
City Public Schools, the Third Circuit ruled that § 1983 is not 
available to remedy violations of § 504.63  In other relatively re-
cent decisions, the First Circuit,64 Fifth Circuit,65 and Seventh 
Circuit66 followed the lead of A.W.  For the remaining circuits, 
the case law on point is relatively limited, probably because (1) 
the aforementioned § 504/ADA direct route has a restricted 
scope in some jurisdictions67; (2) the also aforementioned68 
IDEA exhaustion provision has a dampening effect in the many 
cases of overlap with § 504 and the ADA in light of the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community 
Schools69; (3) the standard for liability for money damages un-
der § 504 and the ADA poses a high hurdle70; and (4) for liabil-
ity cases under all of these attempted avenues, the real target of 
plaintiff-parents, on behalf of their children with disabilities, ul-
 
56. 
 63.  A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 805–06 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 64.  M.M.R.-Z. ex rel. Ramirez-Senda v. Puerto Rico, 528 F.3d 9, 13 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 65.  D.A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 66.  Stanek v. St. Charles Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 67.  See supra note 34. 
 68.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 69.  Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) (requiring completion of the 
IDEA administrative hearing process for Section 504, ADA, and other such claims that are 
based on the IDEA’s central obligation of providing FAPE).  The Fry decision found it unnec-
essary to address the overlapping but separable issue of whether the IDEA’s exhaustion provi-
sion applies to Section 504, ADA, and other suits seeking money damages. Id. A majority of the 
lower courts have required exhaustion of such suits.  E.g., Soto v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 744 F. 
App’x 529 (9th Cir. 2018); Nelson v. Charles City Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2018); 
Durbrow v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., 887 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2018); Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. 
Dist., 877 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2017); J.M. v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 
2017). 
 70.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Do Courts Require a Heightened, Intent Standard for Stu-
dents’ Section 504 and the ADA Claims Against School Districts?,  47 J.L. & EDUC. 109 (2018) 
(canvassing the various circuits to conclude that courts uniformly require deliberate indifference 
or gross misjudgment/ bad faith for money damage claims under § 504/ADA). 
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timately is the “deep pocket” of the school district budget as 
compared with the limited resources of individual school per-
sonnel.71 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION OF THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
In sum, a careful, comprehensive, and current analysis of 
the case law reveals that school personnel are generally not sub-
ject to liability for money damages under the IDEA or § 504, 
either directly or via § 1983.  The exceptions are very limited 
and not practically significant.  Indeed, the author’s search of 
the Westlaw and LRP Special Ed Connection® caselaw data-
bases failed to yield any monetary verdicts against a school dis-
trict teacher or administrator under these overlapping federal 
statutory frameworks.   
Yet, various sources contribute to concerns among not 
only special education teachers and supervisors but also related 
school personnel being subject under the IDEA or § 504/ADA 
to personal liability72—what the courts refer to as “individual 
capacity,” as contrasted with their official capacity as proxies for 
the district’s ultimate liability.73  Given the limited salaries of 
school employees, such fears can serve as a major factor affect-
ing not only their career direction but also, for those who re-
main in public education, their professional innovation, creativ-
ity, and dedication.  Why follow the credo of ethical best 
practice and the focus on effective outcomes rather than rote 
 
 71.  Cf. Schultzen v. Woodbury Cent. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 187 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1127 
(N.D. Iowa 2002). The opinion recognizes “the fears associated with assessing punitive damag-
es against the ‘deep pockets’ of local government.” 
 72.  See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.  For a more general discussion of this 
factor, see Perry A. Zirkel, Paralyzing Fear? Avoiding Distorted Assessments of the Effect of 
Law on Education, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 461 (2006). 
 73.  E.g., Tristan v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 902 F. Supp. 2d 870, 875 (W.D. Tex. 
2012) (distinguishing IDEA claims against public school administrators in individual capacity 
with those in official capacity). 
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compliance if doing so puts one’s house, car, and savings at 
risk? 
Professional school employees are entitled to objectively 
accurate legal information, particularly concerning such high 
stakes issues, so that they may make informed choices about the 
direction and implementation of their career.  For those who 
are committed to student learning, the ultimate motivator 
would seem to be the psychological satisfaction of fulfilling this 
goal, which is all the more special when the client is a student 
with disabilities.  To the extent that external sources of motiva-
tion are warranted, the role of ethical codes in combination 
with employment advancement and accountability, which in-
cludes the downside of termination and other levels of disci-
pline,74 amply suffice.75  Finally, to the extent of clear abuses of 
the rights of students with disabilities, both state common law, 
such as negligence and assault/battery, and § 1983 constitution-
al torts, provide for potential liability for money damages.76  As 
observed more generally,77 paralysis and paranoia in this IDEA 
 
 74.  In some cases, an added consequence may be suspension or revocation of the educa-
tor’s license.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Revocation or Suspension of Educator Certification: A Sys-
tematic Analysis of the Case Law, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 539 (2015). 
 75.  E.g., Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Moon-Williams, 107 So. 3d 205 (Ala. Ct. 
App. 2012) (ruling that hearing officer’s reversal of suspension of special education teacher for 
improper compliance with IDEA was arbitrary and capricious); Sylvester v. Cancienne, 664 So. 
2d 1259 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding demotion of principal for inappropriate restraint of 
student with disabilities); Griffith v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 266 P.3d 932 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2011) (upholding suspension of two special education teachers for refusing to administer feder-
ally mandated academic assessments to their students); Weems v. N. Franklin Sch. Dist., 37 
P.3d 354 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding termination of special education director for alter-
ing student files to feign compliance with the IDEA). 
 76.  However, rulings of personal liability are the exception in these cases, because (1) 
the standards for the federal claims pose a steep uphill slope, (2) for the state claims, many ju-
risdictions retain some form of governmental immunity, and (3) claims against school employ-
ees in their individual capacity are relatively infrequent.  E.g., Susan C. Bon & Perry A. Zirkel, 
The Time-Out and Seclusion Continuum: A Systematic Analysis of Case Law, 27 J. SPEC. 
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 1 (2014); Perry A. Zirkel & Caitlyn A. Lyons, Restraining the Use of Re-
straints with Students with Disabilities: An Empirical Analysis of the Case Law, 10 CONN. PUB. 
INTEREST L.J. 323 (2011) (providing respective empirical analyses of the frequency and out-
comes of federal and state claim categories). 
 77.  See Zirkel, supra note 72. 
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and § 504/ADA context stem from confusing the “lore” with 
the “law.”78  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
As a result, the court in the opening case scenario is 
highly likely to grant the motion for dismissal of K.G.’s claims 
against all of the individual defendants.  The first two counts, 
the IDEA and § 504/ADA, are clearly not viable in any jurisdic-
tion.  The IDEA does not provide the remedy of money dam-
ages, and in any event does not apply to individual defendants.  
Although § 504 and the ADA do provide for money damages, 
they do not apply to individual defendants.   
The § 1983 claims warrant at least a bit more attention.  
First, the court will dismiss the § 1983 claim that is premised 
on § 504/ADA in light of the prevailing judicial authority that 
appears to be without any notable case law exception.  Second, 
for the remaining § 1983-IDEA claim, the court will grant the 
superintendent’s motion for dismissal due to the inapplicability 
of vicarious liability and the absence of any showing of direct 
involvement in the alleged violations.   
For the other defendants, the court will likely conclude 
that, as a matter of law, § 1983 does not provide liability of in-
dividuals in their personal capacity for money damages for vio-
lations of the IDEA.  Alternatively, dismissal is likely due to (a) 
lack of sufficient involvement (e.g., the teacher’s responsibility 
for the alleged grade 9 FAPE violation) or (b) qualified immun-
ity, which serves as a shield at this pretrial stage because the two 
claimed violations are not clearly settled.  More specifically, 
child find is a well-established IDEA obligation that merits 
proactive attention.79  However, its violation in grade 7 in this 
 
 78.  See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Lore v. Law, 13 PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP 50 (Oct. 
2012) (distinguishing prevailing beliefs and practices from objective knowledge of legal re-
quirements). 
 79.  E.g., Robin Parks Ennis, Kimberly Blanton & Antonis Katsiyannis, Child Find Cas-
es under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Recent Case Law, 49 TEACHING 
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case is not at all clear.  The standard for the requisite reasona-
ble suspicion is multi-factored rather than being a matter of one 
or more “red flags,”80 and it is not difficult to find court deci-
sions for which absenteeism or RTI was a notable factor in 
child find rulings against the parents.81  Similarly, qualified im-
munity likely applies.  The reason is that the IDEA obligation 
of the district of residence to offer evaluation and, depending 
on its defensible result, FAPE for a private school child is not 
within the actual or constructive knowledge of the reasonable 
principal or special education director at this time; the applica-
ble case law is not clearly settled as to whether the parent needs 
to trigger this obligation and whether it extends to out-of-state 
placements.82 
The bottom line is that there are many good and posi-
tive reasons for the teacher and his administrative colleagues to 
have been more effective in communication and collaboration 
with K.G.’s parent and in proactively addressing the individual 
needs of K.G.  However, fear of personal liability should not be 
a guiding factor in this or other such special situations.  Instead, 
their focus should be on educational expertise and efficacy, with 
prudent professional discretion rather than undue legal distrac-
tion. 
 
 
 
EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 301 (2017). 
 80.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The “Red Flags” of Child Find under the IDEA: Separating 
the Law from the Lore, 23 EXCEPTIONALITY 192 (2015). 
 81.  E.g., M.G. v. Williamson Cty. Sch., 720 F. App’x 280 (6th Cir. 2018) (RTI); Karris-
sa G. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-CV-01130, 2017 WL 6311851 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 
11, 2017) (absenteeism). 
 82.  E.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Obligations to Students with Disabilities in Private 
Schools, 351 EDUC. L. REP. 688 (2018) (canvassing the split caselaw concerning these and re-
lated issues). 
